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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between time preferences, economic incentives,
and body mass index (BMI). Using data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth, we rst show that greater impatience increases BMI even after
controlling for demographic, human capital, and occupational characteristics as well as
income and risk preference. Next, we provide evidence of an interaction e¤ect between
time preference and food prices, with cheaper food leading to the largest weight gains
among those exhibiting the most impatience. The interaction of changing economic
incentives with heterogeneous discounting may help explain why increases in BMI have
been concentrated amongst the right tail of the distribution, where the health conse-
quences are especially severe. Lastly, we model time-inconsistent preferences by com-
puting individualsquasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters ( and ). Both long-run
patience () and present-bias () predict BMI, suggesting obesity is partly attributable
to rational intertemporal tradeo¤s but also partly to time inconsistency.
Keywords: Obesity, body mass index, time inconsistency, hyperbolic discounting,
present bias, discount factor, discount rate, time preference, food prices
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1 Introduction
Obesity, dened as having a body mass index (BMI) of at least 30, has become a leading
public health concern in the developed world in recent decades.1 The most dramatic rise has
occurred in the United States (US), where the obesity rate skyrocketed from 13% in 1960 to
34% in 2006 (Flegal et al., 1998; National Center of Health Statistics, 2008). Adverse health
conditions attributed to obesity which include heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure,
and stroke lead to an estimated 112,000 deaths per year in the US (Sturm, 2002; Flegal et al.,
2005). Treating obesity-related conditions costs the US an estimated $117 billion annually,
with about half of these expenditures nanced by Medicare and Medicaid (US Department of
Health and Human Services, 2001; Finkelstein et al., 2003). As shown in Figure 1, the rise
in obesity has resulted from both increases in the mean and variance of BMI, as the largest
weight gains have been concentrated amongst the right tail of the BMI distribution. A large
literature attempts to characterize the rise in obesity as an economic phenomenon driven by
changes in economic incentives, particularly falling real food prices (Lakdawalla and Philipson,
2002; Philipson and Posner, 2003; Chou et al., 2004; Lakdawalla et al., 2005; Goldman et al.,
2010; Courtemanche and Carden, 2011). Aggregate trends might help explain the growth in
average BMI, but they cannot explain the heterogeneous nature of this growth unless some
people respond more strongly to changing economic incentives than others.
Our main contribution is to provide evidence that such heterogeneity is partly attributable
to di¤erences in individualstime preferences. We present empirical evidence that impatient
individuals (those with low discount factors) respond more strongly than do patient individuals
to changes in food prices: they gain more weight when food prices fall. Less patience means
relatively more emphasis on present costs such as food prices, as opposed to future costs such
as the health consequences of overeating. Our second contribution is to estimate the e¤ect
of time-inconsistent preferences  quasi-hyperbolic discounting  on weight. We provide
preliminary evidence that time-inconsistent preferences at least partly drive the growth in
1BMI = weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.
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BMI and e¤ect of food prices on BMI.
A growing body of research examines the link between time preference and BMI.2 The
earliest of these studies rely on proxy variables for time preference. Komlos et al. (2004)
illustrate a time-series relationship between obesity and both the savings rate and debt-to-
income ratio in the US, and also show that developed countries with low savings rates have
higher obesity rates. Smith et al. (2005) conduct an individual-level analysis with data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), nding some evidence of a connection
between savings behavior and BMI. Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) study a Dutch dataset
and nd that the extent to which time preference and BMI are related depends heavily on
the choice of proxy. Zhang and Rashad (2008) estimate a link between time preference and
BMI in two datasets, the small Roper Center Obesity survey and the larger Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System. Their proxies for time preference are self-reported willpower in
the former and desire but no e¤ort to lose weight in the latter.
More recent work utilizes direct measures of time preference elicited through questions on
intertemporal trade-o¤s. Chabris et al. (2008) nd a relationship between discount rate and
BMI, as well as other health behaviors such as smoking and exercise, using a sample of adults
in the Boston area. Weller et. al. (2008) study college students in Birmingham, AL and show
that obese women exhibit greater discounting than others. Seeyave et. al. (2009) use a sample
of US children and nd that time preference at age 4 is correlated with being overweight at age
11. Ikeda et al. (2010) estimate a connection between time preference measured either by
discount rate or a proxy variable relating to debt and BMI among Japanese adults. Van der
Pol (2011) uses a sample of Dutch adults and nds that controlling for time preference slightly
attenuates the relationship between education and health outcomes such as BMI. Sutter et.
al. (2013) estimate a signicant correlation between time preferences and BMI, as well as
alcohol and cigarette consumption, among children in Austria.
While important progress has been made in understanding the time preference-BMI con-
2A related literature examines the link between risk preference and BMI; see, for instance, Anderson and
Mellor (2008).
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nection, two important questions remain unanswered. First, even if time preference does
inuence BMI, it is not clear whether this relationship can help to explain the trend in BMI
as opposed to merely the level, as there is a lack of evidence that time preferences have changed
as obesity has been rising. In a meta-analysis of experimental and eld studies on time pref-
erences published from 1978-2002, Percoco and Nijkamp (2009) nd no evidence of changing
time preferences. Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) examine trends in some of their proxy vari-
ables for time preference and nd no evidence that individuals have become systematically
less patient.
A second open question is the extent to which the time preference-BMI connection is
the result of time-inconsistency as opposed to rational intertemporal substitution. If time-
inconsistent preferences are a cause of obesity, then there is a potential economic rationale for
policies designed to alter eating decisions (Cutler et al., 2003). The existing evidence that
hyperbolic discounting contributes to obesity is mostly circumstantial. The National Institute
of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (2008) notes that over 200,000 Americans a
year have bariatric surgery to reduce the size of their stomachs, presumably as a commitment
device to limit susceptibility to self-control problems. Schar¤ (2009) shows that the caloric
consumption of obese individuals is less responsive to nutritional information than that of
other individuals, consistent with hyperbolic discounting. Ikeda et al. (2010) show that a
proxy for procrastination inuences BMI but do not nd a statistically signicant impact
of their more direct measure of hyperbolic discounting a dummy variable for whether the
respondent discounted the future more heavily for a shorter delay than a longer delay. Royer et
al. (2011) show that some individuals voluntarily engage in self-funded committment contracts
to exercise. Finally, Ruhm (2012) documents the high prevalence of weight loss attempts,
which can be considered an admission of past mistakes resulting from time inconsistency.
We contribute to the literature on time preferences and BMI along both of these fronts
using data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). This
survey includes questions on body weight and hypothetical intertemporal trade-o¤s along
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with a rich array of other individual information that enables the construction of a detailed
set of control variables. We begin by demonstrating the validity of our time preference
measure and verifying that the connection between time preference and BMI observed in other
contexts exists in our sample as well. Greater impatience is associated with higher BMI even
after controlling for demographic characteristics, IQ, education, work hours, occupation type,
income, and risk preference. The e¤ects are strongest for whites and males. Falsication tests
provide no evidence of a link between time preference and either height or health conditions
that are less directly tied to eating and exercise, helping to validate the results for BMI.
We then proceed with our two main contributions. First, we match the NLSY to local
price data from the Council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER) and show that
the interaction of time preference and food price is a statistically signicant predictor of
BMI across a wide range of specications, including both cross-sectional and individual xed
e¤ects models. Our preferred estimate implies that the food price elasticity of BMI ranges
from -0.1 for the least patient individuals to statistically indistinguishable from 0 among
those with higher levels of patience. This interaction e¤ect can potentially help explain
why increases in BMI have been concentrated in the right tail of the distribution as food
has become cheaper and more readily available. Although food prices have fallen for most
consumers, their decrease has caused a larger increase in BMI for the least patient consumers,
individuals who already disproportionately comprised the right tail of the BMI distribution.
This heterogeneous response to decreasing food prices can help to explain trends in BMI and
obesity even if individuals have not become more impatient over time.3
Second, we use responses to the NLSYs intertemporal trade-o¤questions to calculate each
individuals quasi-hyperbolic () discounting parameters, decomposing time preferences into
a present bias component  and a long-run component . We then re-run the previous BMI
regressions using these two discounting parameters, nding evidence that obesity is partly
3Heterogeneity in food price changes could also explain some of the increasing variance of the BMI dis-
tribution. For instance, Chung and Myers (1999) provide evidence that the absence of chain stores in poor
neighborhoods in the Twin Cities increases the poors food prices.
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attributable to both present bias and time-consistent impatience.4 Female BMI appears
more strongly driven by present-bias than time-consistent impatience, whereas the reverse is
true for males. The e¤ects of both components of time preference are stronger for whites than
minorities. We also interact  and  with the price of food and show that both present-bias
and long-run discounting strengthen price responsiveness, though only the interaction of 
with food price is consistently statistically signicant.
2 Theoretical Model
We begin by theoretically modeling the roles of time preference and food prices in determining
body weight. A consumer chooses food consumption (f), which provides instantaneous
consumption utility and a¤ects her future weight. Our simple model provides the intuition
behind the impact of prices and the discount factor on food consumption and weight. We
then briey discuss extending the model to analyze time-inconsistent preferences.
Consider a two-period model. The consumer receives an instantaneous utility from food
consumption in the rst period U(f) and pays a per-unit price of p. In the following period,
the consumers weight is a function of food consumption: w = g(f), where g is increasing in f .
The consumer receives a utility from her weight V (w). We assume that the second-period
utility is decreasing in weight, or that the consumer is at or over her ideal weight.5 To simplify
the notation, dene V (f)  V (w) = V (g(f)). First-period utility is increasing and concave
in food consumption: U 0 > 0; U 00 < 0. Second-period utility is decreasing and concave in
food consumption: V 0 < 0; V 00 < 0. The discount factor applied between the two periods is .
The consumers full maximization problem is thus
max
f
U(f)  pf + V (f) (1)
4In contrast to Ikeda et al. (2010), our approach accounts for not only whether individuals exhibit any
present-bias but also the degree of that bias, an important distinction given that almost 85% of our sample is
present-biased. The utilization of this additional information allows us to obtain clearer results.
5This is a reasonable assumption for the vast majority of our sample, as only 0.8% are underweight
(BMI<18.5).
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The rst-order condition is
U 0(f)  p+ V 0(f) = 0 (2)
From an additional unit of consumption, the consumer receives a marginal benet from
instantaneous utility now, pays a marginal cost now, and su¤ers a marginal cost from weight
in the future. We now show how the consumers weight depends on the price of food p, the
discount factor , and how the sensitivity to price varies with the discount factor.
Intuitively, a higher food price should lead to less food consumption and thus lower weight.
This can be veried by evaluating the derivative @w
@p
using the chain rule on w = g(f) and the
implicit function theorem on equation (2).
@w
@p
= g0(f) @f
@p
= g0(f) 1
U 00(f) + V 00(f)
< 0 (3)
The denominator is negative and g0 is positive. Higher food prices lead to less food consump-
tion and therefore lower weight.
Our second intuitive prediction is that more patient consumers should have lower weight,
because the disutility from being overweight occurs only in the future. We evaluate @w
@
in the
same manner as above
@w
@
= g0(f) @f
@
= g0(f)  V
0(f)
U 00(f) + V 00(f)
< 0 (4)
Again the denominator is negative and g0 is positive. The numerator  V 0(f) is positive,
since we assume the consumer is above her ideal weight and thus gets negative utility from
additional weight in the future. A higher discount factor indicates a more patient consumer
and leads to less food consumption and lower weight.
Our third intuitive prediction is that the least patient individuals should be the most
responsive to food prices. The total cost of food is the sum of the explicit monetary price,
paid in the current period, and the health cost, paid in the future period. Impatient people
7
are relatively more concerned with present costs, and therefore should be more responsive to
the monetary price, i.e. their @w
@p
should be higher in absolute value (more negative). Patient
peoplesresponse to food price changes are tempered by their recognition of the future health
costs. Mathematically, @
2w
@@p
> 0.
To calculate this cross-partial derivative, we evaluate the derivative of @w
@p
with respect to
, taking care to observe that within that derivative (equation (3)), f is also a function of 
and the chain rule must be applied accordingly. The cross-partial derivative is
@2w
@@p
=
1
(U 00 + V 00)2


 g0  V 00   g00  V 0 + g0  V 0  U
000 + V 000
U 00 + V 00

(5)
where the arguments of the functions have been dropped for clarity. Our intuitive prediction
was that this derivative should be positive, but in fact its sign is ambiguous. The coe¢ cient
in front of the brackets is positive. The rst term in the brackets ( g0 V 00) is positive, and it
represents the direct intuitive e¤ect that we described above: less patient consumers care less
about the current price and therefore their weight responds less to the price. However, the two
remaining terms pick up indirect e¤ects, and these may be positive or negative. The second
term ( g00  V 0) is the same sign as g00, about which we make no assumptions. If g00  0,
so that food consumption increases weight either constantly or convexly, then this second
term is non-negative, consistent with our intuitive prediction. Lastly, the third term in the
brackets has the same sign as the numerator in the fraction, which involves third derivatives
of U and V . We make no assumptions about these third derivatives. If both are positive, as
would be the case under CRRA preferences, or if both are zero, as would be the case under
quadratic utility, then this term is non-negative and our intuition stands. However, there
are possible cases in which this second derivative may in fact be negative, contrary to our
intuition.6 We thus leave it to our empirical work to determine with more certainty the sign
of this cross-partial derivative. A similar theoretical result is found in a model of rational
6By making assumptions about functional forms and parameter values we are able to numerically nd some
cases where this second derivative is in fact negative, though it is positive in most cases.
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addiction in Becker et. al. (1991, footnote 3). They derive conditions under which relatively
impatient addicts are more responsive to current prices.
This cross-partial derivative can potentially help to explain a fact about recent growth in
consumersBMI. Real food prices have fallen, which may have contributed to the growth in
average BMI (equation (3)). However, prices have fallen for most consumers, yet the growth
in BMI is concentrated in the right tail (Figure 1). This can be explained with two facts
from our model. First, those initially among the right of the BMI distribution are likely those
with lower discount factors (less patient), as predicted by equation (4). Second, if the second
derivative in equation (5) is positive, then these impatient people will respond more strongly
to the falling prices, and therefore the growth in BMI will be right-skewed.
Although we will not directly test the theory that this helps to explain the right-skewed
growth in BMI, we test the predictions of equations (3) and (4), and we test for the sign
of equation (5). The empirical evidence supports both of our predictions and supports the
claim that the second derivative is positive, consistent with our explanation for the right-
skewed growth in BMI.
The two-period model provides the basic intuition and testable hypotheses regarding the
interaction between food prices, discount factors, and weight. It does not allow us to inves-
tigate time-inconsistent preferences, so we can consider a three-period extension of the model
that allows for a consumer with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The long run discount factor is
 and the present-bias is . We do not present details of the model here, but they are available
by the authors upon request. The model demonstrates that weight is negatively a¤ected by
food price and by both discount factors. As consumers discount the future more over the long
run (lower ), or as consumers become more present-biased (lower ), food consumption and
weight increase. As in the two-period model, these intuitive rst-derivative results remain,
whether patience is measured by the long-run discount factor or by present bias.
As with the two-period model, the cross-partial derivative of weight with respect to either
 or  is theoretically ambiguous. Intuition suggests that as consumers become more present-
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focused, either because of a lower  or because of a lower , they should respond more strongly
to price, but the expressions for both @
2w
@@p
and @
2w
@@p
contain a positive-denite term and other
terms with ambiguous sign. As before, we turn to empirical analysis to nd the sign of these
e¤ects.
For simplicity, our model ignores the quality of diet and assumes that all food has the
same e¤ect on weight. An extension to the model considers two types of food ("healthy" and
"unhealthy") with two distinct prices, only one of which a¤ects future weight ("unhealthy"
food). We show that the unhealthy food price has a negative e¤ect on weight and the
discount factor still has an unambiguously negative e¤ect on weight. Details of this extension
are available from the authors upon request.
3 Data
We test these intuitive and theoretical predictions using data from the NLSY, a panel from
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics that follows 12,686 individuals annually from 1979 to 1994
and biennially thereafter.7 We use two di¤erent samples. The rst consists of only the 2006
cross-section, as 2006 is the only year in which time preference information is available. The
second (which we will refer to as the "full sample") consists of most of the panel, starting in
1986 to match our access to price data.8 The 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 surveys include body weight, so the full sample includes 13
waves spanning 21 years. The respondents were between 14 and 22 years old at the start of
the panel, making our age range 41 to 50 in 2006 and 21 to 50 in the full sample. Height is
reported in 2006 and also slightly before our sample period in 1985. Since all respondents
were adults throughout the sample, the 1985 and 2006 heights are very similar. We use 2006
height and have veried that the results are very similar using 1985 height or the average of
7The 12,686 respondents consist of a random sample of 6,111 plus supplemental samples of 5,295 minority
and economically disadvantaged youths and 1,280 military youths. We employ the NLSYs sampling weights
throughout the analysis.
8Our price data begin in 1985, but we will be including one lag of price, which necessitates starting the
sample in 1986.
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the two years.
Our main dependent variable is BMI, which we compute from these self-reports of weight
and height. Following Cawley (1999) and others, we adjust for measurement error in self-
reported weight and height by exploiting the fact that another national dataset, the National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), includes both actual and self-reported
measures. Using the NHANES, we predict actual weight and height as a quadratic function of
self-reported weight and height for each sex and race (white, black, or another race) subgroup.
We then adjust NLSY weights and heights accordingly and use the adjusted values to compute
BMI. The correlation between actual and self-reported BMI is very high, and the results are
nearly identical if we do not employ the correction.9
Our independent variables of interest are time preference measures computed from two
questions on hypothetical intertemporal trade-o¤s available in the 2006 NLSY survey.10 The
rst question is,
"Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately. How-
ever, you have the alternative of waiting one year to claim the prize. If you do
wait, you will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money
in addition to the $1000 you would have to receive one year from now to convince
you to wait rather than claim the prize now?"
We compute respondentsdiscount factors which we name "Discount Factor 1" (DF1)
9We use the 2005-2006 NHANES wave for this correction to provide the best possible match to our 2006
sample. It is possible that using correction coe¢ cients from 2005-2006 to predict height and weight in all
the years of our full sample could introduce some measurement error. However, the fact that the results
are virtually identical if we do not employ the correction suggests that such out-of-sample predictions are
not introducing systematic bias. It is not possible to construct an NHANES sample to span the entire time
horizon of our full sample, as it did not become continuous until 1999.
10DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) utilize the NLSY (and PSID) to explore the implications of impatience
for job search decisions. The authors construct a measure of impatience via factor analysis of several proxies
for impatience, such as smoking, life insurance, and contraceptive use. Cadena and Keys (2011) use NLSY
data to investigate the e¤ects of impatience on human capital formation. Their measure of impatience comes
from the survey interviewers assessment of the subject.
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from their answers (amount1) as follows:
DF1 =
1000
1000 + amount1
: (6)
The second question is,
"Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately. How-
ever, you can choose to wait one month to claim the prize. If you do wait, you
will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in addition
to the $1000 you would have to receive one month from now to convince you to
wait rather than claim the prize now?"
We use these answers (amount2) to compute annualized discount factors (via exponential
annualization) named "Discount Factor 2" (DF2) through the following formula:
DF2 =

1000
1000 + amount2
12
: (7)
DF1 is our preferred measure of time preference since it is computed directly from the question
about an annual delay, and thus is not subject to the compounding of response error that the
annualized question based on monthly delay will be. We utilize DF2 as well as the average
of DF1 and DF2 (denoted DF ) in some of the robustness checks. Our conclusions are not
sensitive to the use of discount rates instead of factors.11
We exploit the fact that the 2006 NLSY contains two intertemporal discounting questions,
one over a monthly interval and the other over an annual interval, to compute a measure of
present-bias. A time-consistent individual should have the same (annualized) discount factor
over the monthly interval as the annual interval. By contrast, a present-biased individual will
display decreasing impatience and have a greater discount factor for the annual delay than
the monthly delay. We jointly t an individuals responses to both intertemporal questions
11Note that the above discount factor computations implicitly assume linear utility.
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using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting specication, whereby individuals discount outcomes
 periods away at  : The parameter  reects an individuals "long-run" level of patience,
whereas  reects any disproportionate weight given to the immediate present at the expense
of all future periods (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997). If  = 1; then quasi-hyperbolic
discounting reduces to traditional, time-consistent discounting, whereas  < 1 reects time-
inconsistent present-bias. Assuming annual periods, an individuals joint responses to these
two questions imply that

1
12 =
1000
1000 + amount2
(8)
 =
1000
1000 + amount1
(9)
yielding  = (1000+amount2
1000+amount1
)
12
11 and  = 1000
(1000+amount1)
:
Some economists object that hypothetical questions, such as our intertemporal discounting
questions, provide no incentive for respondents to carefully assess the intertemporal trade-o¤
and thus may not be representative of individuals true preferences. However, at least in
the domain of time preferences, several studies have demonstrated no di¤erence in responses
between real and hypothetical decisions. Johnson and Bickel (2002) and Madden et al. (2003)
nd no signicant di¤erence between the discounting of real versus hypothetical monetary
amounts, and Ubfal (2012) nds no signicant di¤erence between discounting of real versus
hypothetical consumable goods as well as money. Although some studies demonstrate a
di¤erence between real and hypothetical time discounting decisions, there is no consensus over
the direction of bias. Kirby and Marakovic (1995) found that subjects discounted real amounts
more impatiently, whereas Coller and Williams (1999) found that respondents discounted real
amounts more patiently.
Table 1 presents the correlations between each of the time preference measures from the
2006 sample. The correlation between the annual DF1 and the monthly DF2 is 0.58. DF1
is more closely associated with long-run patience  whereas DF2 is more closely related to
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present bias : We also demonstrate the validity of the time preference questions by correlating
our four time preference measures to several economic variables with an obvious intertemporal
component. A more patient response to the annual discounting question, DF1; is correlated
with more educational attainment, a greater percentile score on the Armed Forces Qualication
Test (AFQT), and a greater net worth.12 Individuals with patient responses were also less
likely to have any credit card debt, less likely to have maxed-out credit cards, less likely to
have ever declared bankruptcy, and less likely to be smokers. Our  and  parameters are
identied from an individuals joint responses to the monthly and annual questions, and one
concern might be that these parameters simply reect calculation errors. However, Table 1
reveals that the  and  parameters are similarly correlated with education, credit card debt,
bankruptcy, and smoking, which suggests that individualsresponses to these questions are
not simply noise but are reective of intertemporal preferences.
We also utilize the answer to a 2006 NLSY question on risk preference as a control in order
to address the possible concern that time and risk preference are correlated. This question
is:
"Suppose you have been given an item that is either worth nothing or worth
$10,000. Tomorrow you will learn what it is worth. There is a 50-50 chance
it will be worth $10,000 and a 50-50 chance it will be worth nothing. You can
wait to nd out how much the item is worth, or you can sell it before its value is
determined. What is the lowest price that would lead you to sell the item now
rather than waiting to see what it is worth?"
Other information available in the NLSY allows us to construct a detailed set of control
variables. The demographic controls are age and dummies for gender, race, and marital
status. AFQT percentile proxies for intelligence.13 We measure educational attainment with
12Net worth is computed by the NLSY based on respondentsanswers to a variety of questions on income
sources, assets, and liabilities.
13The AFQT is the exam taken by prospective entrants into the United States military. It consists of
vocabulary, reading comprehension, analytical, and mathematics components. It was administered to all
NLSY respondents, regardless of sex or military status, in 1985.
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dummy variables for high school degree but no college, some college but less than a four-
year degree, and college degree or higher. The omitted category is less than a high school
degree. Hours worked per week and indicator variables for white collar, blue collar, or service
occupation (relative to the omitted category of no paid work) reect labor market activity.14
We also control for total household income.15
The NLSY also contains a health module administered to respondents the rst survey
after their 40th birthdays either 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, or 2006. Information on chronic
conditions allows for the construction of indicator variables for arthritis, anemia, chronic kid-
ney or bladder problems, and chronic stomach problems. These dummies serve as dependent
variables in the falsication tests. Since these variables are only recorded once for each
respondent, we only conduct the falsication tests with the cross-sectional sample.
We match these individual-level data to local price information from the C2ERs American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association Cost of Living Index (ACCRA COLI). The
ACCRA COLI computes quarterly prices for a wide range of grocery, energy, transportation,
housing, health care, and other items in 311 local markets throughout the US. Most of these
local markets are single cities, but some are multiple cities (i.e. Bloomington-Normal, IL)
while others are entire counties (i.e. Dare County, NC). We rst compute annual prices
for each market by averaging over all quarters in the year in which prices for the market
are available. We then use the county identiers from the restricted version of the NLSY
14We classify an individual as "white collar" if she reports an occupation of executive, administrative, and
managerial; management related; mathematical and computer scientists; engineers, architects, and surveyers;
engineering and related technicians; physical scientists; social scientists and related; life, physical, and social
science technicians; counselors, social, and religious; lawyers, judges, and legal support; teachers; education,
training, and library; media and communications; health diagnosing and treating; health care technical and
support; sales and related; or o¢ ce and administrative support. We classify an individual as "blue collar" if
her occupation is entertainers and performers, sports and related; farming, shing, and forestry; construction
trade and extraction; installation, maintenance, and repairs; production and operating; setters, operators, and
tenders; transportation and material moving; military specic; or armed forces. We classify an individual as
"service" if her occupation is protective service; food preparation and serving related; cleaning and building
service; entertainment attendants and related; funeral related; personal care and service; sales and related;
o¢ ce and administrative support; or food preparation.
15In order to retain as much of the sample as possible, we impute missing values of the controls by taking
the midpoint of the previous and subsequent survey waves. We considered adding a set of dummies indicating
whether these variables were imputed but they were highly insignicant and had no meaningful impact on the
results. We did not impute missing values of BMI; these observations were dropped.
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to match each respondent in each year to the closest ACCRA COLI market. This leads to
measurement error in the price variables that increases with distance from the nearest ACCRA
COLI market. To mitigate potential attenuation bias, in the regressions that include prices
we drop the respondents living in counties greater than 50 miles from the closest ACCRA
COLI area (approximately 11% of the sample). The conclusions reached are similar using
30, 40, 60, and 70 mile distance cuto¤s. Our food price variable is the average price of the 16
reported food items, weighted by their share as given by the ACCRA COLI.16 The same set
of weights is used for all areas. Table 2 lists these items while giving their average prices and
weights. We also construct a non-food price variable by taking the weighted averages of the
price indices for housing, utilities, transportation, health care, and miscellaneous goods and
services. Additionally, in some specications we use separate prices for the fruit/vegetable,
meat, and other (generally unhealthy) food items, as denoted in Table 2.
Tables 3 and 4 report the names, descriptions, means, and standard deviations for the
variables that will be used in the regression analyses, both for the 2006 and full 1986-2006
samples. Since the time and risk preference variables are only available in 2006, for the other
years of the full sample we assign respondents their 2006 values. In other words, we assume
time and risk preferences are stable across the sample period. We discuss the implications of
this assumption in Section 4.2. Similarly, AFQT score is only reported in 1985, so we assign
the 1985 value to all years.
Turning to the summary statistics for the key variables, the average BMI is 28.3 in 2006
and 26.3 in the full sample. The mean discount factor is 0.6 using the annual delay question
and 0.3 using the monthly delay question, corresponding to a 66% and 257% annual interest
rate. Though this degree of nancial impatience may appear implausibly high, note that the
NLSY questions explicitly establish receiving money immediately as the status quo. A robust
nding is that preferences are sticky towards a status quo option, and measuring patience via
16Despite the weighting, it should be noted that the food basket is not necessarily representative of average
food consumption, as it is missing many important components such as dairy products, pasta, and rice.
Nonetheless, the ACCRA COLI provides the most appropriate price data for our analysis because of the
narrow geographic level at which the data are available.
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this willingness to delay methodology yields greater elicited impatience than methods which
do not impose an immediate intertemporal reference point (Loewenstein, 1988; Shelley, 1993;
McAlvanah, 2010). The average respondent is more patient over longer delays, supportive of
hyperbolic discounting or diminishing impatience. The quasi-hyperbolic specication implies
that the average individual discounts any future outcome with  equal to 0.80, and subsequent
periods with discount factor of 0.75, or about 33% per year. The inclusion of  implies a
more patient level of annual discounting than the prior specications. 85% of individuals have
 < 1, indicating that the vast majority of respondents are present-biased. 7% of respondents
reported perfect patience on both questions and are therefore exactly time-consistent with
 = 1. 8% of respondents are hyperopic and future-biased with  > 1. This asymmetry of 
about 1 suggests that this variable is not merely representing noise from subjectsmisreporting.
The average ination-adjusted price of the basket of 16 foods is $3.69 in the full 1986-2006
sample. There is substantial time-series and cross-sectional variation in food price in our
sample. Food prices fell for 87% of respondents during the sample period, with average price
dropping from $3.91 in 1986 to $3.53 in 2006. The range of food prices observed in the average
year is $2.16, or a sizeable 59% of the mean. There is also considerable within-individual
variation in food price, as the correlation between current food price and its rst lag is only
0.61 in the full sample.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Discount Factor and BMI
The two main objectives of this paper are to examine the interaction e¤ect of time preference
and food price on BMI, and to test whether the e¤ect of time preference on BMI is driven by
time-consistent patience or present-bias. Before turning to these questions, it is important
to verify that the previously-documented connection between time preference and BMI exists
in our sample. We therefore begin by estimating the association between discount factor
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and BMI using the 2006 sample and conducting falsication tests to assess the validity of the
results. Our main regression equation is
BMIi = 0+1DF1i+2DEMOi+3HCi+4LABORi+5INCOMEi+6RISKi+"i
(10)
where i indexes individuals.17 DF1 is the preferred annual discount factor measure described
in Section 3. DEMO is a set of demographic controls including age and indicators for gender,
race, and marital status. HC is a set of variables reecting endowment of and investment in
human capital; these include AFQT score and dummies for educational attainment. LABOR
is a set of controls for labor market activity, comprised of work hours and indicators for
whether an individuals employment is blue-collar, white-collar, or service industry, relative
to the omitted category of unemployment. INCOME consists of real income and its square
since prior research has documented an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and
BMI (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002). Finally, RISK is the measure of risk preference.
We include the sets of control variables in an e¤ort to isolate the ceteris paribus relationship
between time preference and BMI. If levels of patience and BMI both di¤er systematically
on the basis of age, gender, race, marital status, intelligence, education, income, time spent
working, or risk preference, failing to adequately control for these variables may bias the
estimators of 1.18
17In an unreported regression (full results available upon request), we use BMI category rather than BMI
as the outcome variable and estimate an ordered probit model. The categories are healthy weight (BMI<25),
overweight but not obese (25BMI<30), class I obese (30BMI<35), and severely obese (BMI35):The
marginal e¤ect of discount factor on P(Overweight but not Obese) is small and insignicant, but the marginal
e¤ects of discount factor on P(Class I Obese) and P(Severely Obese) are -0.027 and -0.033 and are signicant
at the 5% level.
18We do not control for some of the variables shown to be correlated with discount factor in Table 1 net
worth, credit card debt, maxed-out credit cards, bankruptcy, and smoking  because in our judgment the
literature strongly suggests that they are causally a¤ected by time preference. Including them could therefore
lead to an over controlling problem in which we "control away" some of the mechanisms through which time
preference causally a¤ects BMI. In unreported regressions, we do control for these variables and they only
slightly attenuate the association between discount factor and BMI. Less obvious over controlling problems
could also exist for some of the variables we do include in the reported regressions, such as AFQT score,
education, work hours, and income. This highlights the importance of showing that the estimated e¤ect
of discount factor remains similar across a number of specications with di¤erent combinations of control
variables.
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Table 5 reports the key results; full regression output is available upon request. We begin
in column (1) with a simple regression of BMI on discount factor and then gradually add the
sets of controls to build up to the full model in column (6). As robustness checks, in columns
(7) and (8) we replace DF1 with DF2 and DF , respectively. Discount factor is statistically
signicant and negatively associated with BMI in all eight regressions, suggesting that greater
patience decreases weight. Including the demographic and human capital controls in columns
(2) and (3) attenuates the coe¢ cient estimate for 1 somewhat, but across columns (3) to (6)
the e¤ect stabilizes at -0.97 to -1.08 units. The results from columns (3) to (6) imply that a
one standard deviation increase in discount factor (0.25) decreases BMI by an average of 0.24
to 0.27 units, or 1.6 to 1.8 pounds at the sample mean height of 67.55 inches. Columns (7) and
(8) show that the results are similar using the alternative discount factor measures. Though
we are of course unable to control for every potential confounding factor, the robustness of the
link between discount factor and BMI increases our condence that the relationship is causal
rather than spurious.
Table 6 displays the estimates of 1 splitting the sample by gender and race, usingDF1 and
the full set of control variables. The e¤ect of discount factor on BMI is strong and signicant
for men, and still negative but smaller and slightly insignicant for women.19 When stratifying
by race, discount factors impact is strong and signicant for whites but small and insignicant
for non-whites.
We close this section with a series of falsication tests. First, we re-estimate equation
(10) using height in inches instead of BMI as the dependent variable. Since it is implausible
that impatience a¤ects BMI by making people shorter rather than increasing their weight,
such a nding would call into question the validity of the identication strategy. We then
utilize as dependent variables chronic health conditions that are less directly the result of in-
19Ikeda et. al. (2010) provide similar ndings. In their regressions (from data on a Japanese subject
pool), the coe¢ cient on the discount rate is larger for males than for females, though not signicantly so in
the regressions with demographic controls. Without demographic controls, the coe¢ cient for males is about
twice as high as that for females, and only the coe¢ cient on males is signicant. While we are unsure why the
connection between time preference and BMI is stronger for men than women, the fact that similar results have
been found in Japan suggests that cultural factors unique to the US do not provide a su¢ cient explanation.
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tertemporal choices than BMI: arthritis or rheumatism; kidney or bladder problems; stomach,
liver, intestinal, or gall bladder problems; and anemia. We also consider a dependent vari-
able representing the total number of these conditions reported. While it is di¢ cult to nd
health outcomes that are completely independent of health behaviors, we expect that these
conditions should at least be less directly tied to behaviors than obesity. A large "e¤ect" of
discount factor on these outcomes would therefore suggest a mis-specied model rather than
a causal e¤ect. We estimate linear models for height, probit models for the individual health
conditions, and a Poisson model for the total number of conditions. Table 7 reports the mar-
ginal e¤ects. Discount factor is never signicant at even the 10% level. These results increase
our condence that the ndings for BMI are not the artifact of omitted variables correlated
with patience and either health or stature. The falsication tests also help alleviate concerns
about reverse causality, as having a high BMI might decrease an individuals life expectancy
and thereby cause her to optimize over a shorter time horizon. If this were the case, the
measured discount factor should be correlated with all health problems regardless of whether
they are the direct result of behaviors.
4.2 Interaction of Discount Factor and Food Prices
We next test the prediction that impatience strengthens the response to food prices by exam-
ining heterogeneity in the e¤ect of local food prices on BMI on the basis of discount factor.
Food prices are perhaps the most obvious economic incentive related to body weight, and the
decline in real food prices in recent decades is generally regarded as a contributing factor to
the rise in obesity (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002 and 2005; Philipson and Posner, 2003;
Chou et al., 2004; Goldman et al., 2010). Changing economic incentives such as falling food
prices may explain the increase in the mean of the BMI distribution, but do not explain why
the variance of the distribution has also increased. We hypothesize that changing incentives
have interacted with individualslevels of patience to both shift the BMI distribution to the
right and thicken its right tail. Testing for an e¤ect of the interaction of discount factor and
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food prices provides a preliminary test of this theory.
4.2.1 Cross-Sectional Regressions
Our initial regression is similar to equation (10) but adds local food prices (PFOOD), non-
food prices (PNF ), and the interaction of food prices with discount factor:
BMIic = 0 + 1DF1ic +2DEMOic +3HCic +4LABORic +5INCOMEic (11)
+6RISKic + 7PFOODc + 8(DF1ic  PFOODc) + 9PNFc + "i
where c indexes counties.20 Controlling for non-food prices helps ensure that the estimated
e¤ect of food price is not simply capturing a more general price e¤ect. Because of the addition
of county-level variables, we now cluster standard errors by county.
Table 8 displays the results from estimating equation (11) using the 2006 sample. We
again start with a model with no controls, gradually build up to the full specication in
column (6), and experiment with the alternative discount factor measures DF2 and DF in
columns (7) and (8). Consistent with results from the literature (e.g. Chou et al., 2004),
the coe¢ cient estimate for food price is negative across all eight specications in Table 8 and
signicant at the 5% level or better in seven of the eight. The interaction term is positively
associated with BMI and signicant at the 10% level or better in all eight regressions. These
results support the intuitive prediction that more patient people respond less strongly than
impatient people to changes in food prices. The coe¢ cient estimates for the interaction term
are all well within each others condence intervals, ranging from 1.98 to 3.17. Aside from the
regression that computes discount factor exclusively from the monthly delay question (column
(7)), the estimates are all within the narrower range of 3.02 to 3.17 and signicant at the 5%
level.
20Our model assumes that the e¤ect of food price on BMI changes linearly across the discount factor
distribution. We have also estimated models using a quadratic functional form for discount factor, as well as
a series of dummies splitting the discount factor distribution into thirds and fths. We did not observe clear
evidence of nonlinearities, so we present the results from the simple linear specication.
21
4.2.2 Panel Regressions
This cross-sectional strategy has two important limitations. First, identication of the food
price e¤ect requires the strong assumption that no unobservable determinants of BMI are
correlated with food prices. Areas with high demand for food may have both higher food
prices and higher BMI, while other local area-level economic variables such as food store
and restaurant densities may inuence both food prices and BMI. Second, a cross-sectional
equation ignores the dynamics of the food price e¤ect. Our theoretical framework treats
weight as a function of food prices in the prior period, as weight is a capital stock that
is determined by past eating "investments." Accordingly, Goldman et al. (2010) provide
evidence that the long-run e¤ect of food prices on BMI is stronger than the short-run e¤ect.
To address both of these issues, we also consider a specication that utilizes the full sample
of 1986-2006. The panel nature of the NLSY allows for the inclusion of individual xed
e¤ects to control for unobservable characteristics that are stable over time. The identifying
assumption for the food price e¤ect therefore becomes merely that changes over time in
unobservable determinants of BMI are uncorrelated with changes over time in food prices.21
It also allows for the matching of individuals to lagged food prices without having to impose
the assumption that people remain in the same county over time.
On the other hand, using a panel strategy to test whether impatient individuals gain more
weight in response to falling food prices requires the assumption that time preferences are
stable across the entire period. Some evidence suggests that time preferences are relatively
stable within an individual. Simpson and Vuchinich (2000) demonstrate a high test-retest
reliability for time preferences measured in lab experiments, and Meier and Sprenger (2010)
nd a similar high degree of stability for time preferences in a longitudinal eld experiment.
In both of these studies, the within-person stability of time preference was similar to those
of personality traits. Moreover, even if time preferences do change within individuals, this
21Results (available upon request) are similar if we include both individual and county xed e¤ects, though
the estimates are slightly less precise. This is not surprising, as county xed e¤ects only provide new
information for people who move during the sample period.
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measurement error would lead to attenuation bias that would cause us to underestimate the
interaction e¤ect of time preference and food prices. In other words, the results from the panel
regressions can perhaps be viewed as conservative.
Our panel specication adds individual and year xed e¤ects to equation (11), while drop-
ping the time-invariant covariates discount factor, risk preference, AFQT score, race, and
gender. Importantly, the interaction of discount factor with food price does not drop out of
the model, as food price varies over time. We experimented with di¤erent lag lengths, nding
that the rst lag of food price and the interaction of food price with discount factor were
consistently signicant but that second, third, or fourth lags were consistently insignicant.
We therefore include one lag of food price and the interaction term in the model. We also
add one lag of each of the controls to guard against bias from lagged price being correlated
with lagged controls.22 The resulting regression equation is
BMIict = 0 +11DEMOict +12DEMOic;t 1 +21HCict +22HCic;t 1 + (12)
31LABORict +32LABORic;t 1 +41INCOMEict +42INCOMEic;t 1 +
51PFOODct + 52PFOODc;t 1 + 61(DF1ic  PFOODct) +
62(DF1ic  PFOODc;t 1) + 71PNFct + 72PNFc;t 1 + i +  t + "ict
where t denotes survey year, DEMO no longer includes the gender and race dummies, HC
no longer includes AFQT score, and i and  t are the individual and year xed e¤ects. Of
particular interest are the "total e¤ects" of food price and the interaction of discount factor
with food price. These are simply the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged e¤ects:
51 + 52 and 61 + 62, respectively.
Table 9 reports the results from the xed e¤ects regressions, gradually adding controls
up to the full model in column (5), with columns (6) and (7) utilizing the alternative dis-
22Recall that our full sample consists of 13 waves spanning 21 years. The average lag length is therefore
approximately 1.6 years, with some lags being one year and others being two years.
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count factor measures.23 All 14 coe¢ cient estimates for food price and lagged food price are
negative, and 13 of the 14 are signicant. Consistent with the intertemporal nature of our
theoretical framework, lagged food price appears to have about twice as strong an e¤ect on
BMI than contemporaneous food price. All 14 coe¢ cient estimates for the interaction term
and the lagged interaction term are positive and signicant, with the lagged interaction of
discount factor with food price having roughly twice as strong an e¤ect on BMI as the con-
temporaneous interaction. Turning to the total e¤ects, the "total food price e¤ect" is always
signicant at the 5% level or better while the "total interaction e¤ect" is always signicant at
the 1% level. Compared to the estimates from the cross-sectional regressions, the total e¤ects
of food price and the interaction of discount factor with food price are both smaller in the
xed e¤ects regressions but they are also both much more precisely estimated. In fact, the
estimated total e¤ects from Table 9 are always within the 95% condence interval of the cor-
responding estimate from Table 8. In other words, it is possible that the apparent di¤erences
in magnitudes could simply be due to the imprecision of the cross-sectional estimates.
To summarize, both the cross-sectional and panel regressions provide robust evidence that
the e¤ect of food price on BMI is strongest for impatient individuals. The cross-sectional
regressions suggest stronger heterogeneity in the food price e¤ect, which could be the result
of upward bias in the cross-sectional estimator, attenuation bias in the xed e¤ects estimator,
or simply the imprecision of the cross-sectional estimates. To err on the side of caution, we
focus on the xed e¤ects estimates throughout the rest of this section.
4.2.3 Simulations
Figure 2 uses the estimates from the xed e¤ects model with the full set of controls (column
(5) of Table 9) to show how the marginal e¤ect of food price on BMI changes across the
discount factor distribution. The solid line shows the marginal e¤ect, while the dashed lines
represent the endpoints of the 95% condence interval. A $1 increase in food price (27%
23Table 9 has one less column than Table 8 because risk preference is dropped from the model since it is
time invariant in our data.
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of the sample mean) decreases the BMIs of the most impatient individuals by 0.6 units, or
4 pounds at the sample mean height. This is a decrease of 2.3% of the sample mean BMI,
implying a food price elasticity of BMI of -0.1. The e¤ect of food prices on BMI steadily
weakens with additional patience, reaching zero at a discount factor of 0.69. Though the sign
ips to positive after that point, the marginal e¤ect does not become positive and signicant
at the 5% level until the very top of the discount factor distribution.
Figures 3-5 illustrate how this heterogeneity in the food price e¤ect can a¤ect the variance
of the BMI distribution. We perform an approximate median split and dene "impatient"
individuals as those with discount factors below 0.5 and "patient" individuals as those with
discount factors above 0.5. We use the regression results from the xed e¤ects model in column
(5) of Table 9 to plot the predicted BMI distributions for the two groups at the approximate
high end of the food price range observed in our full sample ($5.50), the approximate low
end of this range ($2.50), and the midpoint of this range ($4.00).24 Underneath the gures,
we also report the mean BMI, percentage overweight or obese (BMI 25), percentage obese
(BMI 30), and percentage severely obese (BMI 35) for the impatient and patient groups
at each price point. Figure 3 shows that at a relatively high food price, the BMI distributions
of patient and impatient individuals are very similar, as are their mean BMIs and rates of
being in unhealthy weight categories. Figure 4 shows that at a medium food price a gap
begins to emerge between the BMI distributions of the patient and impatient groups, with the
overweight, obesity, and severe obesity rates becoming 4, 3, and 2 percentage points greater
for the impatient group. Figure 5 shows that at a low food price the di¤erence between the
BMI distributions of patient and impatient individuals becomes quite pronounced. The rates
of overweight, obesity, and severe obesity are now 8, 5, and 4 percentage points greater for
those who are impatient. These are sizeable di¤erences, representing 13%, 18%, and 36% of
the overweight, obesity, and severe obesity rates of the patient group, respectively.
24Predicted BMI is computed simply by adding to actual BMI the di¤erence between simulated ($5.50, $4,
or $2.50) and actual food price times the coe¢ cient estimate for food price, and the di¤erence between the
interaction term at the simulated and actual food price times the coe¢ cient estimate for the interaction term.
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4.2.4 Robustness Checks and Extensions
We close our investigation of the interaction e¤ect of discount factor and food prices by
estimating some additional variants of the xed e¤ects model using the full sample. Table
10 reports the results from several robustness checks to help further increase our condence
that the results from Table 9 can be considered causal. The rst through third columns test
for reverse causality between BMI and food prices by controlling for future food price. The
rst column includes food price in the subsequent year, the second column includes food price
in the second subsequent year, and the third column adds both of these leads.25 If future
food prices predict contemporaneous BMI conditional on current food prices, the BMIs of a
citys residents likely inuence the market price of food rather than the other way around.
The fourth column of Table 10 controls for interactions of food prices with all the other
covariates in the model, addressing the possible concern that estimated heterogeneity by time
preference might actually reect heterogeneity by characteristics that are correlated with time
preference, such as income and education. Finally, the fth column controls for interactions
of discount factor with county xed e¤ects. This tests for the possibility that the estimated
e¤ect of the interaction of discount factor and food price could simply reect heterogeneous
e¤ects of patience on BMI across geographic regions. As shown in Table 10, the estimates of
interest remain very similar to those from Table 9 in all these robustness checks. Additionally,
future food prices are not statistically associated with BMI, so there is no evidence of reverse
causality.26
Finally, we address the potential concern that the food basket used to compute market
prices contains both healthy and unhealthy items, whereas the rise in obesity may be the
result of cheaper junk food rather than lower across-the-board food prices. We divide the 16
food items into three categories: fruits/vegetables (lettuce, bananas, potatoes, peas, peaches,
25Since we have ACCRA COLI data through 2008, adding two leads does not require us to drop any
observations.
26In unreported regressions, we repeated the falsication exercises with height and the other health condi-
tions as the dependent variables and the full set of controls. Neither discount factor nor its interaction with
food prices was ever statistically signicant.
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and corn), grocery meats (steak, beef, chicken, sausage, eggs, tuna), and other foods (white
bread, cereal, and the three restaurant meals). The fruits/vegetables category contains the
most unambiguously healthy foods, so one might expect their prices and the interaction of
their prices with discount factor to have little or no e¤ect on BMI. In contrast, the "other
foods" category contains items that are either high in starchy carbohydrates, fats, or both,
and therefore could be considered the most unambiguously unhealthy. Their price e¤ects
may therefore be the strongest. The "grocery meats" category is perhaps in between the
other two categories in terms of healthfulness, as they are relatively calorie-dense but high in
protein and low in carbohydrates.
Table 11 reports the results from estimating a xed e¤ects regression with prices for each
of these three di¤erent types of foods, along with their interactions with discount factor:
BMIict = 0 +11DEMOict +12DEMOic;t 1 +21HCict +22HCic;t 1 + (13)
31LABORict +32LABORic;t 1 +41INCOMEict +42INCOMEic;t 1 +
51PFRV EGct + 52PFRV EGc;t 1 + 61(DF1ic  PFRV EGct) +
62(DF1ic  PRV EGc;t 1) + 71PMEATct + 72PMEATc;t 1 +
81(DF1i  PMEATct) + 82(DF1ic  PMEATc;t 1) + 91POTHERct +
92POTHERc;t 1 + 10;1(DF1ic  POTHERct) + 10;2(DF1ic 
POTHERc;t 1) + 11;1PNFct + 11;2PNFc;t 1 + i +  t + "ict
where PFRV EG, PMEAT , and POTHER are the prices of fruits/vegetables, meats, and
other foods. The results are as expected. We nd no evidence that fruit/vegetable price or
its interaction with discount factor inuence BMI. The total e¤ects of meat prices, other food
prices, and their interactions with discount factor are all signicant at the 10% level or better
and have the same signs as the earlier estimates using the entire basket. However, both the
price and interaction e¤ects are larger in magnitude for other foods than meats, consistent
with our assumption that the foods in the "other" category are the least healthy.
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4.3 Time-Inconsistent Discounting and BMI
The nal section of our empirical analysis provides a preliminary attempt to determine the
degree to which the observed relationship between time preference and BMI reects rational
intertemporal substitution as opposed to self-control problems. As described in Section 3,
the 2006 NLSY contains two intertemporal discounting questions, one over a monthly interval
and the other over an annual interval, allowing us to t the  (present-bias) and  (long-run
patience) parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic specication. The three-period theoretical model
predicted that both  and  should inuence BMI. We test these predictions by replacing
the univariate measure of discounting from our previous regressions with both  and . The
main BMI regression takes the form
BMIi = 0+1i+2i+3DEMOi+4HCi+5LABORi+6INCOMEi+7RISKic+"i
(14)
while the cross-sectional specication adding prices and the interactions of food prices with 
and  is
BMIi = 0 + 1i + 2i + 3DEMOi + 4HCi + 5LABORi + 6INCOMEi + (15)
7RISKi + 8PFOODc + 9(i  PFOODc) + 10(i  PFOODc) + 11PNFc + "i:
and the xed e¤ects model using the full sample is
BMIict = 0 + 11DEMOict + 12DEMOic;t 1 + 21HCic + 22HCic;t 1 + (16)
31LABORict + 32LABORic;t 1 + 41INCOMEict + 42INCOMEic;t 1 +
51PFOODct + 52PFOODc;t 1 + 61(ic  PFOODct) +
62(ic  PFOODc;t 1) + 61(ic  PFOODct) + 62(ic  PFOODc;t 1) +
71PNFct + 72PNFc;t 1 + i +  t + "ict: (17)
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To conserve space, we only report the results from the full-sample regressions with all the
control variables, along with those from the regressions evaluating heterogeneity by gender,
race, and food category. We have, however, re-estimated all the robustness checks and
falsication tests from Tables 5-10 replacing discount factor with  and  and veried that
our ndings are not sensitive to specication. These results are available upon request.
The results in the rst column of Table 12 show that both present-bias  and long-run
patience  are statistically signicant and negatively associated with BMI. Present bias and
long-run impatience therefore both separately inuence weight. The magnitudes imply that
a one standard deviation increase in  (decrease in present bias) reduces BMI by 0.2 units,
or 1.3 pounds at the sample mean height, while a standard deviation increase in  (time-
consistent patience) reduces weight by 0.17 BMI units or 1.1 pounds. The second and third
columns reveal that the coe¢ cient on  is negative and statistically signicant for women
but  is not signicant, whereas the reverse pattern holds for men. This suggests that the
relationship between intertemporal preferences and BMI is driven by present bias for females,
but time-consistent impatience for males. Stratifying by race shows that both  and  predict
the BMI of whites, but there is no evidence that either inuence the weight of non-whites.
Table 13 presents the results for the interaction of  and  with food prices. The rst
column uses the 2006 sample and cross-sectional research design, the second column uses the
full sample and xed e¤ects approach, and the third column uses the xed e¤ects model with
multiple food categories. We focus our discussion on the "total e¤ects" of the interactions of
 and  with food prices. These are simply the coe¢ cient estimates for the contemporaneous
interaction terms in the cross-sectional model, and the sum of the estimates for the contem-
poraneous and lagged interaction terms in the two xed e¤ects models. The cross sectional
and xed e¤ects results both indicate that the interaction of  and food prices is positive
and statistically signicant, while the interaction of  and food prices is also positive but
marginally insignicant. When multiple food categories are used, the interactions of  with
meat and "other food" prices both signicantly increase BMI, while the interactions of  with
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meat and "other food" prices are also positively associated with BMI but are insignicant.
In all, the evidence that time-inconsistent individuals respond more strongly to food prices
is therefore clearer than the evidence regarding the interaction of time-consistent impatience
and food prices.
5 Conclusion
This study investigates the connection between time preferences, economic incentives, and
BMI. Our theoretical model predicts that greater impatience increases BMI and might
strengthen individualsresponses to food prices. We test these predictions using the NLSY
matched with local price data from C2ER. Impatience is associated with BMI and the prob-
abilities of being overweight and obese across a wide range of specications. Interacting
discount factor with food prices reveals that the gap between the weights of impatient and
patient individuals is larger in counties with lower food prices. Finally, we consider time-
inconsistent quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Both present bias () and the long-run discount
factor () are negatively correlated with BMI, and their interactions with food prices are pos-
itively correlated with BMI, though only the interaction with  is statistically signicant.
Our study aims to combine two strands of the literature on the economic causes of obesity
in an e¤ort to help explain why the BMI distribution has not only shifted to the right but also
thickened in the right tail. The majority of the literature focuses on the inuence of economic
factors such as food prices on weight. While society-wide changes in economic incentives can
explain the shift to the right in the BMI distribution, they alone cannot explain why individuals
in the right tail of the distribution have experienced the largest weight gains while others in the
left tail have not gained any weight. Another portion of the literature links time preference
to BMI, but has left unclear whether this link can help to explain the rise in obesity since
the best available evidence suggests time preferences are reasonably stable. We propose that
incentives and impatience interact to explain the changes in the BMI distribution in recent
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decades. As economic factors lower the opportunity cost of food consumption, impatient
individuals gain weight while the most patient individuals do not. Mean BMI therefore rises
but the rise is concentrated among a subset of the population. We provide a preliminary test
of this theory in the context of food prices.
Our results suggest several potentially interesting directions for future research. First,
future work should examine whether the interaction of time preference with other economic
incentives, such as those that a¤ect the opportunity cost of physical activity rather than
eating, also predict BMI. Future research should also test our theory across a broader time
period, as our data only span two of the nearly four decades of the sharp rise in obesity.
Further study of how the e¤ects di¤er across di¤erent demographic groups could also have
interesting implications. For instance, from 1960 to 1994 the rise in obesity was similar for
men and women, but from 1999 to 2010 obesity prevalence only increased for men (Flegal et
al., 1998; Ogden et al., 2012). We nd a stronger connection between overall time preference
and BMI for men, but a stronger connection between present-bias and BMI for women. If
these results prove to be generalizable, time-consistent patience may be more relevant for the
recent portion of the rise in obesity than it was for the earlier decades, but the reverse may
be true for present-bias.
It is also worth noting that the theory of rational addiction makes a similar prediction to
ours about the interaction e¤ect: addicts who are more patient are less responsive to current
prices (Becker et. al. 1991). Townsend (1987) and Chaloupka (1991) test this prediction
with data on cigarette consumption, but with proxies for patience (class and education, re-
spectively). Though not in the context of a model of rational addiction, our tests using
the interaction of food prices and individual time preferences are the rst such tests of this
prediction utilizing a direct measure of patience rather than indirect proxies.
Our paper also provides the rst attempt to explicitly model quasi-hyperbolic discounting
parameters  and  and test their separate inuences on BMI and obesity. The results suggest
that the intertemporal trade-o¤s that determine body weight are at least partly due to time-
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inconsistent discounting, which has potential policy implications. The standard rationale for
policies aimed at curbing obesity comes from externalities associated with obesity, such as
medical expenditures paid by the government or other members of a private insurance pool.
However, Bhattacharya and Sood (2011) argue that there are no externalities from obesity,
i.e. that the costs of obesity are paid for by the obese person himself or herself through either
out-of-pocket medical costs or foregone wages. Time inconsistency could provide a di¤erent
rationale for interventions that move more of the costs of overeating into the present period,
such as taxes on unhealthy foods. Such a conclusion depends on how we ought to conduct
welfare analysis under time-inconsistent preferences. One argument is that we should treat
the present bias as a "mistake" or a type of market/behavioral failure, and the social planner
should maximize using a welfare function that does not include . This is the approach taken
by Heutel (2011), ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) and Gruber and Koszegi (2001). Others,
e.g. Bernheim and Rangel (2009), propose a di¤erent set of welfare criteria and do not nd
that present bias justies policy intervention in all cases.
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Table 1 Correlation of Time Preference Measures with Intertemporal
Variables
Discount Factor Measure DF1 DF2 Beta Delta
Annual DF1        
Monthly DF2 0:58
(0:00)
     
Beta 0:50
(0:00)
0:75
(0:00)
   
Delta 0:73
(0:00)
0:09
(0:00)
 0:13
(0:00)
 
High school  0:06
(0:00)
 0:06
(0:00)
 0:08
(0:00)
 0:01
(0:43)
Some college  0:01
(0:61)
0:002
(0:84)
0:01
(0:27)
 0:01
(0:39)
College 0:10
(0:00)
0:07
(0:00)
0:11
(0:00)
0:02
(0:12)
AFQT 0:13
(0:00)
0:11
(0:00)
0:22
(0:00)
 0:02
(0:11)
Net worth 0:11
(0:00)
0:08
(0:00)
0:11
(0:00)
0:03
(0:01)
Any credit card debt  0:07
(0:00)
 0:02
(0:12)
 0:03
(0:01)
 0:03
(0:01)
Maxed-out credit cards  0:08
(0:00)
 0:07
(0:00)
 0:07
(0:00)
 0:03
(0:01)
Ever Bankrupt  0:05
(0:00)
 0:03
(0:04)
 0:03
(0:01)
 0:02
(0:18)
Smoker  0:07
(0:00)
 0:02
(0:11)
 0:07
(0:00)
 0:03
(0:05)
Notes: Pairwise correlations with p-values in parentheses. ***
statistically signicant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; *10% level.
Observations are weighted using the NLSY sampling weights.
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Table 2 ACCRA COLI Food Items (2006)
Item Average Price Weight
Fruits and vegetables
Head of iceberg lettuce 1.219 0.0267
1 lb. bananas 0.518 0.0555
10 lb. sack potatoes 3.753 0.0264
15 oz. can sweet peas; Del Monte or Green Giant 0.826 0.0110
29 oz. halves or slices peaches; Hunts, Del Monte, or Libbys 1.805 0.0127
16 oz. whole kernel frozen corn 1.240 0.0110
Meats
1 lb. t-bone steak 8.383 0.0354
1 lb. ground beef 2.539 0.0354
1 lb. whole uncut chicken 1.057 0.0440
Dozen large eggs; grade A or AA 1.150 0.0100
6 oz. chunk of light tuna; Starkist or Chicken of the Sea 0.746 0.0378
Other foods
24 oz. white bread 1.175 0.0861
18 oz. box of corn akes; Kelloggs or Post 2.987 0.0399
1/4 lb. patty with cheese; McDonalds 2.549 0.1133
11" to 12" thin crust cheese pizza; Pizza Hut or Pizza Inn 10.250 0.1133
Thigh and drumstick of chicken; Kentucky Fried Chicken or Churchs 2.863 0.1133
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Table 3 Summary Statistics for BMI, Time Preference, and Food Price
Variables
Variable Name Description Mean (SD)
2006 Full
BMI Body mass index (kg/m2) 28:26
(5:76)
26:31
(5:43)
Beta Computed using quasi-hyperbolic discounting specication 0:80
(0:20)
0:80
(0:20)
Delta Computed using quasi-hyperbolic discounting specication 0:75
(0:33)
0:75
(0:33)
Discount factor 1 Based on amount needed to wait a year to receive $1000 0:59
(0:25)
0:59
(0:26)
Discount factor 2 Based on amount needed to wait a month to receive $1000 0:28
(0:34)
0:28
(0:34)
Food price Weighted average price of 16 food items (2006$) 3:53
(0:28)
3:69
(0:38)
Non-food index Weighted average price index of non-food price categories 106:01
(18:64)
109:24
(22:69)
Fruit/vegetable price Weighted average price of 6 fruits/vegetables (2006$) 1:47
(0:20)
1:51
(0:23)
Meat price Weighted average price of 5 grocery meats (2006$) 2:94
(1:30)
3:04
(0:34)
Other food price Weighted average price of 5 other foods (2006$) 4:64
(0:39)
4:31
(0:35)
Note: Observations are weighted using the NLSY sampling weights. n = 5982 in the 2006 analysis
sample, and 63; 950 in the 1986-2006 analysis sample. SD=standard deviation.
39
Table 4 Summary Statistics for Control and Falsication Test Variables
Variable Name Description Mean (SD)
2006 Full
Age Age in years 44:87
(2:230)
34:47
(6:59)
Female 1 if female 0:48
(0:50)
0:48
(0:50)
Race: black 1 if race is black 0:13
(0:34)
0:14
(0:34)
Race: other 1 if race is neither black nor white 0:03
(0:16)
0:02
(0:16)
Married 1 if married 0:64
(0:48)
0:60
(0:49)
AFQT Percentile score on armed forces qualifying test in 1985 48:97
(28:54)
49:19
(28:66)
High school 1 if highest grade completed=12 0:41
(0:49)
0:42
(0:49)
Some college 1 if 13highest grade completed15 0:24
(0:42)
0:23
(0:42)
College 1 if highest grade completed16 0:28
(0:45)
0:26
(0:44)
White collar 1 if current occupation is white collar 0:56
(0:50)
0:52
(0:50)
Blue collar 1 if current occupation is blue collar 0:23
(0:42)
0:28
(0:45)
Service 1 if current occupation is service 0:10
(0:30)
0:11
(0:31)
Hours worked Average hours worked per week in the preceding year 35:92
(19:40)
35:27
(18:69)
Income Total household income ($10,000s; 2006$) 8:31
(8:41)
7:33
(11:77)
Risk Amount ($1,000s) to forego a 50% chance of $10,000 or $0 4:79
(3:27)
4:79
(3:26)
Arthritis 1 if ever had arthritis or rheumatism 0:12
(0:32)
 
Kidney/bladder 1 if kidney or bladder problems 0:05
(0:21)
 
Stomach 1 if trouble with stomach, liver, intestines, or gall bladder 0:10
(0:30)
 
Anemia 1 if anemic 0:04
(0:21)
 
  indicates these variables are not used in the 1986-2006 sample. See other notes for Table 3.
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Table 5 Discount Factor and BMI
Dependent Variable: BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Discount factor  1:44
(0:35)
 1:30
(0:35)
 1:08
(0:35)
 1:07
(0:35)
 0:97
(0:35)
 1:02
(0:35)
 0:87
(0:26)
 1:20
(0:34)
Demographics NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Human capital NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Labor NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Income NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Risk NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
D. factor measure DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1 DF2 DF
Observations 5982 5982 5982 5982 5982 5982 5982 5982
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically signicant
at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the NLSY sampling
weights. "Demographic" controls include age, gender, race, and marital status. "Human
capital" controls include AFQT score and the education dummies. "Labor" controls include
work hours and white collar, blue collar, and service indicators. "Income" controls include
income and income2. "Risk" control is the measure of risk preference.
Table 6 Heterogeneity by Gender and Race
Dependent Variable: BMI
Gender Race
Women Men White Non-White
Discount factor  0:74
(0:50)
 1:36
(0:49)
 1:17
(0:41)
 0:22
(0:54)
Demographics YES YES YES YES
Human capital YES YES YES YES
Labor YES YES YES YES
Income YES YES YES YES
Risk YES YES YES YES
Discount factor measure DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1
Observations 2989 2993 3894 2088
See notes for Table 5.
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Table 11 Multiple Food Categories: Full Sample
Dependent Variable: BMI
(1)
Fruit/vegetable price  0:02
(0:21)
Fruit/vegetable price lag 0:32
(0:22)
Meat price  0:01
(0:01)
Meat price lag  0:26
(0:14)
Other food price  0:38
(0:12)
Other food price lag  0:13
(0:12)
Discount factor*fruit/vegetable price  0:11
(0:30)
Discount factor*fruit/vegetable price lag  0:44
(0:32)
Discount factor*meat price 0:02
(0:02)
Discount factor*meat price lag 0:40
(0:21)
Discount factor*other food price 0:61
(0:19)
Discount factor*other food price lag 0:16
(0:18)
Total fruit/vegetable price e¤ect 0:30
(0:35)
Total meat price e¤ect  0:28
(0:14)
Total other food price e¤ect  0:51
(0:15)
Total discount factor*fruit/vegetable price e¤ect  0:55
(0:50)
Total discount factor*meat price e¤ect 0:42
(0:21)
Total discount factor*other food price e¤ect 0:77
(0:23)
Demographics YES
Human capital YES
Labor YES
Income YES
Risk YES
Observations 63950
See notes for Table 9.
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Table 12 Time Inconsistency and BMI
Dependent Variable: BMI
All Women Men White Non-White
Beta  0:98
(0:46)
 1:36
(0:62)
 0:60
(0:67)
 1:16
(0:53)
0:23
(0:71)
Delta  0:51
(0:25)
 0:23
(0:37)
 0:84
(0:35)
 0:58
(0:32)
 0:24
(0:35)
Demographics YES YES YES YES YES
Human capital YES YES YES YES YES
Labor YES YES YES YES YES
Income YES YES YES YES YES
Risk YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5982 2989 2993 3894 2088
See notes for Table 5.
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Table 13 Interaction of Beta and Delta with Food Prices
Dependent Variable: BMI
2006 Sample Full Sample Multiple Prices
Beta  16:87 (5:88)    
Delta  6:28 (3:49)    
Food price  4:59 (1:70)  0:44 (0:19)  
Food price lag    0:61 (0:36)  
Beta*food price 4:33 (1:67) 0:52 (0:22)  
Beta*food price lag   0:38 (0:37)  
Delta*food price 1:63 (1:00) 0:005 (0:114)  
Delta*food price lag   0:34 (0:18)  
Fruit/vegetable price     0:07 (0:35)
Fruit/vegetable price lag     0:39 (0:42)
Beta*fruit/vegetable price      0:07 (0:32)
Beta*fruit/vegetable price lag      0:36 (0:39)
Delta*fruit/vegetable price      0:14 (0:23)
Delta*fruit/vegetable price lag      0:06 (0:24)
Meat price      0:03 (0:03)
Meat price lag      0:52 (0:26)
Beta*meat price     0:05 (0:04)
Beta*meat price lag     0:40 (0:24)
Delta*meat price      0:01 (0:02)
Delta*meat price lag     0:23 (0:15)
Other food price      0:80 (0:23)
Other food price lag     -0:03 (0:24)
Beta*other food price     0:85 (0:22)
Beta*other food price lag      0:09 (0:24)
Delta*other food price     0:14 (0:15)
Delta*other food price lag     0:10 (0:12)
Total food price e¤ect  4:59 (1:70)  1:05 (0:36)  
Total food price*beta e¤ect 4:33 (1:67) 0:89 (0:37)  
Total food price*delta e¤ect 1:63 (1:00) 0:34 (0:21)  
Total fruit/vegetable price e¤ect     0:46 (0:62)
Total fruit/vege. price*beta e¤ect      0:43 (0:56)
Total fruit/vege. price*delta e¤ect      0:20 (0:39)
Total meat price e¤ect      0:55 (0:26)
Total meat price*beta e¤ect     0:45 (0:24)
Total meat price*delta e¤ect     0:22 (0:16)
Total other food price e¤ect      0:83 (0:30)
Total other food price*beta e¤ect     0:75 (0:31)
Total other food price*delta e¤ect     0:24 (0:18)
Observations 5353 63950 63950
All controls are included. See other notes for Table 5 for the rst regression, and Table 9 for the
second and third.
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Figure 1 Change in BMI Distribution from 1971-1975 to 2003-2008
The 1971-1975 distribution is estimated using the National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES) I, while the 2003-2008 distribution is estimated by pooling the 2003-2004, 2005-
2006, and 2007-2008 NHANES. Between 1971-1975 and 2003-2008, the mean of the BMI distribution
rose from 23.0 to 25.3 while the standard deviation increased from 5.9 to 7.4.
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Figure 2 Marginal E¤ect of Food Price on BMI Across Discount Factor
Distribution
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Solid line represents point estimate; dashed lines represent endpoints of 95%
condence interval.
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Figure 3 BMI Distributions by Degree of Patience at Food Price=$5.50
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% Overweight or Obese: 67.8% for impatient, 68.7% for patient
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Figure 4 BMI Distributions by Degree of Patience at Food Price=$4.00
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Figure 5 BMI Distributions by Degree of Patience at Food Price=$2.50
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% Severely Obese: 13.9% for impatient, 10.2% for patient
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